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Applying International Human Rights Law for 
Use by Facebook 
Michael Lwin† 
In recent years, social media platforms have been beset with hate 
speech, misinformation, disinformation, incitement of violence, and other 
content that cause real-world harm. Social media companies, focusing 
solely on profit-maximization and user-engagement, have been largely 
asleep at the wheel during outbreaks of violence in countries such as My-
anmar, Sri Lanka, New Zealand, and India–events all linked in some way 
to online content. When social media companies began trying to reduce 
harmful content, they made tweaks: incremental, non-transparent, and 
often inconsistent changes to their moderation rules.  To build a more ef-
fective and consistent system, some international lawyers have suggested 
that social media companies adopt international human rights law 
(IHRL)–especially the International Covenant for Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR)–as a unified source for content moderation rules. How-
ever, IHRL was written and ratified for use by states, not private compa-
nies. Moreover, IHRL emerged long before the Internet and social media 
were widespread. IHRL must therefore be interpreted and adapted for 
this new purpose. As a first step towards honing and refining its applica-
tion, this article proposes a framework for the use of IHRL by social me-
dia companies.  
                                                        
† Managing Director, Koe Koe Tech. I would like to give my sincere thanks to Susan Benesch, 
Matthew Bugher, Zoe Darmé, Khoe Reh, Andrew Smith, Brent Harris, Abigail Bridgman, 
Thomas Kadri, Thomas Hughes, Katherine Bond, Noah Feldman, Sarah Oh, Matthew Smith, 
Wai Yan, Benjamin Staubli, Winsandar Soe, and Thant Sin for their comments and insights in-
forming this essay. I would also like to thank Rachel Brown, Talya Lockman-Fine, Myat Su San, 
Rohan Subramanian, Frances O’Morchoe, Andrew Santana, and John Willis for their hard work 
editing this essay. 
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I. Introduction 
We are making rules up. 
Facebook Policy Team Member1 
 
The slow response by social media companies to halt the spread of 
hate speech, misinformation, disinformation, incitement of violence, and 
other attempts to invoke harm on their platforms is well known by now. 
These include the incitement of mob violence on WhatsApp and Face-
book in India,2 the Christchurch shooter livestream on YouTube, Reddit, 
and Facebook,3 and the relentless building of support for mass atrocities 
in Myanmar.4 
The prevailing paradigm of techno-libertarianism, which focuses 
solely on profit-maximization and active user retention and engagement, 
leads to real harm.  During the early years of social media, the ties be-
tween platforms and violence were easier to ignore, and the people who 
ran most of these companies did so. Take Facebook as an example. There 
were no international lawyers or cultural anthropologists at the top levels 
of Facebook, which helped to explain the company’s initial lack of re-
sponse and subsequent fumbling reactions to freedom of expression and 
incitement to violence issues on the platform. In response to sustained 
criticism,5 Facebook has since hired people from the international devel-
opment space to create their Oversight Board. These included former 
UN Peacekeeping Officer, Zoe Darmé,6 the ICC’s Abigail Bridgman,7 
                                                        
1 MATTHIAS C. KETTEMANN & WOLFGANG SCHULZ, LEIBNIZ INSTITUTE FOR MEDIA 
RESEARCH, SETTING RULES FOR 2.7 BILLION: A (FIRST) LOOK INTO FACEBOOK’S NORM-
MAKING SYSTEM: RESULTS OF A PILOT STUDY, 28 (Jan. 2020) https://leibniz-
hbi.de/uploads/media/Publikationen/cms/media/5pz9hwo_AP_WiP001InsideFacebook.pdf. 
2 Amanda Taub & Max Fisher, Where Countries Are Tinderboxes and Facebook Is a Match, 
N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/21/world/asia/facebook-sri-lanka-
riots.html [https://perma.cc/N4RL-WFJ5]. 
3 Kevin Roose, A Mass Murder of, and for, the Internet, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2019), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/15/technology/facebook-youtube-christchurch-shooting.html 
[https://perma.cc/9EFQ-QNVT]. 
4 Steve Stecklow, Why Facebook Is Losing the War on Hate Speech in Myanmar, REUTERS 
(Aug. 15, 2018) https://www.reuters.com/investigates/special-report/myanmar-facebook-hate 
[https://perma.cc/9HMN-328M]. 
5 See, e.g., Kevin Roose & Paul Mozur, Zuckerberg Was Called Out Over Myanmar Violence. 
Here’s His Apology, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 9, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/09/business/facebook-myanmar-zuckerberg.html 
[https://perma.cc/Y67T-WAWQ]; George Soros, Remove Zuckerberg and Sandberg from Their 
Posts, FINANCIAL TIMES (Feb. 17, 2020), https://www.ft.com/content/88f6875a-519d-11ea-90ad-
25e377c0ee1f [https://perma.cc/M7LD-LDZL]. 
6 Jen Patja Howell, The Lawfare Podcast: Zoe Darmé on the Facebook Oversight Board, 
LAWFARE (Nov. 14, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/lawfare-podcast-zoe-darme-facebook-
oversight-board [https://perma.cc/JWK9-2ZCK]. Note, however, that Zoe Darmé and Sarah Oh–
the latter of whom was the leader of strategic response at Facebook–are no longer with Face-
book. The author has recently been informed that Facebook is reducing staffing for policy 
teams. 
7 Abigail Bridgman is no longer with Facebook; she has joined the Oversight Board as a Case 
Selection Manager as of this writing. 
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and the International Center for Transnational Justice’s Miranda Sis-
sons.8 Most recently, Facebook hired Thomas Hughes, former Executive 
Director of INGO ARTICLE 19, to be Chief Administrator of its pend-
ing Oversight Board.9 It is unclear, however, whether all of these new 
hires and expenses will actually result in tangible and positive change at 
Facebook or just amount to another elaborate corporate greenwashing 
scheme for business as usual.10  
Matthias C. Kettemann and Wolfgang Schulz of the Leibniz Institute 
for Media Research were permitted by Facebook to conduct a “pilot 
study into the private order of communication” at Facebook and “its pol-
icy development process.”11  Their study shows how Facebook's platform 
is not grounded in any one national legal order. Facebook’s policies are 
influenced by competing interests, but overall by the preferences of lead-
ers such as Mark Zuckerberg, Sheryl Sandberg, Monika Bickert (VP of 
Global Policy Management),12 and Joel Kaplan (VP for US Public Poli-
cy).13 Kettemann and Schulz, in their observations of Facebook employ-
ees, noted that even those employees with backgrounds in human rights 
failed to refer to concrete human rights norms during working group dis-
cussions or stakeholder engagements.14 Facebook employees themselves 
acknowledge that “we are making rules up.”15 There exists no formal 
framework or procedures for content moderation decisions. As 
Kettemann and Schulz note, “[i]n any normative-social setting it holds 
true that, if the outcome of a procedure might be–for any reason–not in-
trinsically legitimate, then the proceduralization can increase its legitima-
cy and make a normative change amenable to those not agreeing with the 
                                                        
8 Joshua Brustein, Facebook’s First Human Rights Chief Confronts Its Past Sins, BLOOMERG 
(Jan. 28, 2020) https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-01-28/facebook-s-first-human-
rights-chief-seeks-to-tame-digital-hate [https://perma.cc/GQ5K-DLC5]. 
9 Brent Harris, Preparing the Way Forward for Facebook’s Oversight Board, FACEBOOK (Jan. 
28, 2020), https://about.fb.com/news/2020/01/facebooks-oversight-board. 
10 See, Julia Carrie Wong, Will Facebook's New Oversight Board Be a Radical Shift or a Repu-
tational Shield?, THE GUARDIAN (May 2, 2020), 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2020/may/07/will-facebooks-new-oversight-board-be-a-
radical-shift-or-a-reputational-shield [https://perma.cc/D3QG-K7TS] (quoting Siva 
Vaidhyanathan) (“‘I wish I could say that the Facebook review board was cosmetic, but I’m not 
even sure that it’s that deep,’ said Siva Vaidhyanathan, a professor of media studies at the 
University of Virginia and author of a book on Facebook. ‘If Facebook really wanted to take 
outside criticism seriously at any point in the past decade, it could have taken human rights 
activists seriously about problems in Myanmar; it could have taken journalists seriously about 
problems in the Philippines; it could have taken legal scholars seriously about the way it deals 
with harassment; and it could have taken social media scholars seriously about the ways that it 
undermines democracy in India and Brazil. But it didn’t. This is greenwashing.’”). 
11 KETTEMANN & SCHULZ, supra note 1, at 5. 
12 KETTEMANN & SCHULZ, supra note 1, at 28-29. 
13 See, e.g., Ben Smith, What’s Facebook’s Deal With Donald Trump?, N.Y. TIMES (Jun. 21, 
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/21/business/media/facebook-donald-trump-mark-
zuckerberg.html [https://perma.cc/B6RT-QPQV]. 
14 KETTEMANN & SCHULZ, supra note 1, at 32. 
15 KETTEMANN & SCHULZ, supra note 1, at 28. 
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particular policy outcome as well.”16 I strongly agree with Kettemann and 
Schulz on this point. In this essay, I argue that the framework I propose 
can act as the “proceduralization” necessary to increase both Facebook’s 
and the Oversight Board’s legitimacy.  
In seeking a single consistent and effective source of content moder-
ation rules, scholars have suggested that social media companies turn to 
international human rights law (IHRL), especially certain instruments on 
freedom of speech and speech regulation.17 However, IHRL was written 
for use by states, not private enterprises. Moreover, its language can of-
ten be contradictory. For example, Article 4 of the International Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) 
requires states to “declare an offence punishable by law all dissemination 
of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial dis-
crimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts 
against any race or group of persons of another colour or ethnic origin.”18 
Article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR), on the other hand, only outlines optional state prohibitions, 
which must comply with a three-part test of legality, legitimacy, and ne-
cessity, thereby conflicting with ICERD’s Article 4 requirements for state 
prohibitions.  Both of these articles further conflict with the narrow 
standard for required state prohibitions under ICCPR Article 20.19  
IHRL institutions and observers are themselves aware of these in-
consistencies. The ICERD Committee’s General Recommendation No. 
35–adopted in 2013–claws back the expansive language of ICERD Article 
4, recommending “that the criminalization of forms of racist expression 
should be reserved for serious cases, to be proven beyond reasonable 
doubt, while less serious cases should be addressed by means other than 
criminal law, taking into account, inter alia, the nature and extent of the 
impact on targeted persons and groups. The application of criminal sanc-
tions should be governed by principles of legality, proportionality and ne-
cessity,”20 with the last clause being a clear reference to ICCPR Article 
19(3). The ICERD committee gets its recommendation powers from the 
ICERD treaty.21 The Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression, 
                                                        
16 KETTEMANN & SCHULZ, supra note 1, at 28. 
17 See, e.g., Evelyn Aswad, The Future of Freedom of Expression Online, 17 DUKE L. & TECH. 
REV. 26-70 (2018); ARTICLE 19, Side-stepping Rights: Regulating Speech by Contract (2018), 
https://www.article19.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/Regulating-speech-by-contract-WEB-
v2.pdf; David Kaye, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the 
Right to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/38/35 (Apr. 6, 2018), 
https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/1631686/usage?ln=en. 
18 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) 
art. 4, Dec. 21, 1965, T.I.A.S. 94-1120, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 
19 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) art. 19 and 20, Dec. 16, 1966, 
999, T.I.A.S. 92-908, U.N.T.S. 171. 
20 UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, General recommendation No. 
35: Combatting Racist Hate Speech, para. 12, CERD/C/GC/35 (Sept. 26, 2013), 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/53f457db4.html. 
21 ICERD, supra note 18, at art. 9(2). 
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David Kaye, claims that the ICERD committee “explained that the con-
ditions defined in article 19 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights also apply to restrictions under article 4 of the Interna-
tional Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimina-
tion.”22 IHRL institutions often rely on their special rapporteurs and 
committees to smooth over or issue clarifying interpretations of the lan-
guage in multilateral treaties. 
Further, decisions by human rights tribunals are also often flawed 
and inconsistent. It is conceivable that the Oversight Board could adopt 
IHRL, in whole or in part (more likely in part and with adaptations), via 
one or more binding content decisions into the Oversight Board’s juris-
prudence. If done too broadly or unthoughtfully, such action may prompt 
(i) human rights lawyers to demand formal adoption of regional and do-
mestic tribunal decisions, and (ii) countries to compel the Oversight 
Board to adopt domestic legislation, much of which tends to be over-
broad, excessively restrictive, and overly favourable towards state inter-
pretations of expression and incitement.  
IHRL itself can be an unclear and inconsistent set of laws and rules. 
How can Facebook and its Oversight Board be expected to come up with 
clear and consistent content moderation rules while at the same time re-
specting IHRL? Is it possible for Facebook and the Oversight Board to 
avoid acting as judge, jury, and executioner? The answer is yes. This essay 
attempts to apply IHRL to social media companies in a way that is ac-
tionable not only for the companies themselves, but also the entities that 
regulate their content moderation decisions such as the Oversight Board 
that Facebook has promised to establish23 as well as the Social Media 
Councils that Article 19 has proposed.24 Although the framework is in-
tended for use by any platform, this essay will focus on Facebook and its 
Oversight Board given the fact that the Board has been charged with 
adopting new jurisprudence. 
II. Why Should IHRL Apply to Social Media Companies? 
A. Social Media Companies Lack Legitimacy 
The new Oversight Board has an opportunity to address the deficit 
of transparency and legitimacy surrounding Facebook’s current content 
moderation rules and processes. However, the Board, as currently set up, 
risks perpetuating these problems. The Oversight Board’s legitimacy 
                                                        
22 David Kaye, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Promotion and Protection of the Right 
to Freedom of Opinion and Expression, para. 16, U.N. Doc.  A/74/486 (Oct. 9, 2019), 
https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/Opinion/A_74_486.pdf. 
23 Harris, supra note 9. 
24 ARTICLE 19, Social Media Councils: Consultation (Jun. 11, 2019), 
https://www.article19.org/resources/social-media-councils-consultation. 
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comes from Facebook itself. The Oversight Board has its own charter25 
and bylaws,26 which were drafted by Facebook. It is composed of 40 
members, including 4 co-chairs, who are selected by Facebook.27 Unsur-
prisingly, many observers have noted that the creation of the Oversight 
Board, however well-intentioned, may have been a cover for Facebook to 
continue business as usual.28 This conflict-of-interest issue persists in the 
tests that Facebook says it has developed. In 2019, Monika Bickert, Vice 
President of Global Policy Management and Chair of the Product Policy 
Forum at Facebook, said that their main goal was less about introducing 
new rules but rather providing “clarity”.29 Along this vein, Facebook has 
recently changed certain values in the preamble of its Community Stand-
ards. These values now comprise voice, authenticity, safety, privacy, and 
dignity.  
Voice is the “paramount” value. The “goal of [Facebook’s] Commu-
nity Standards is to create a place for expression and give people voice. 
Building community and bringing the world closer together depends on 
people’s ability to share diverse views, experiences, ideas and infor-
mation.”30 It appears that “voice” is largely equivalent to the concept of 
                                                        
25 Brent Harris, Establishing Structure and Governance for an Independent Oversight Board, 
FACEBOOK (Sept. 17, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/09/oversight-board-structure. 
26 Harris, supra note 9. 
27 Oversight Board Bylaws § 1.1.2, FACEBOOK (Jan. 2020) https://about.fb.com/wp-
content/uploads/2020/01/Bylaws_v6.pdf (“Facebook will select the initial co-chairs.”). 
28 See, e.g., Evelyn Douek, How Much Power Did Facebook Give Its Oversight Board?, 
LAWFARE (Sep. 25, 2019), https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-much-power-did-facebook-give-
its-oversight-board [https://perma.cc/V4JN-TN54] (“I have long been arguing that if the board’s 
“subject matter jurisdiction” (that is, the range of Facebook decisions that it is empowered to 
review) is too narrow, its legitimacy will be undermined. For example, if the board can review 
only cases where Facebook decides to take a post down and has no power to review algorithmic 
ranking decisions, Facebook can avoid having the board pronounce on cases it would prefer not 
to be overruled on by simply downranking a troubling post so that no one sees it without formal-
ly triggering the board’s jurisdiction. Ad policies, and especially political ad decisions, are critical 
decisions about political discourse—yet they can be opaque and inconsistent. There is no reason 
these decisions should not also be the subject of independent review.”); Shirin Ghaffary, Here’s 
How Facebook Plans to Make Final Decisions About Controversial Content It’s Taken Down, 
VOX (Jan. 28, 2020) https://www.vox.com/2020/1/28/21112253/facebook-content-moderation-
system-supreme-court-oversight-board [https://perma.cc/U6VB-TKCB] (“Several experts Re-
code spoke with called the updates a step in the right direction for greater transparency, but say 
that the project’s success will depend on how much the company actually listens to this new gov-
erning body. Under the proposed rules, Facebook will be forced to follow the board’s decisions 
when it rules that the company should not have taken down content. But for broader policy deci-
sions, Facebook will only take guidance — not mandates — from the board.”); Casey Newton, 
Facebook is Putting a Surprising Restriction on Its Independent Oversight Board, THE VERGE 
(Jan. 30, 2020), https://www.theverge.com/interface/2020/1/30/21113273/facebook-oversight-
board-jurisdiction-bylaws-restrictions [https://perma.cc/NUL7-4VM3]. (“I’m less certain the 
board will have a say here. It will have the authority to remove (or leave standing) individual 
pieces of content, as well as issue policy advisory opinions. Key word: advisory. And while an 
opinion by the board that Facebook should fact-check political ads would have some weight — 
and could provide political cover for Facebook to reverse course, should it decide it wants to — 
ultimately the decision will likely still remain with Zuckerberg.”). 
29 See KETTEMANN & SCHULZ, supra note 1, at 17 (quoting Monika Bickert). 
30 Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards (last vis-
ited July 21, 2020). 
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freedom of expression. When Facebook limits expression or voice, it does 
so by appealing to the other stated values of authenticity, safety, privacy, 
and dignity.31 As Kettemann and Schulz note, “[i]n light of these values, 
Facebook professes to not wanting ‘people using Facebook to misrepre-
sent who they are or what they’re doing,’ trying to minimize expression 
‘that threatens people [and] has the potential to intimidate, exclude or si-
lence others,’ with the aim of protecting ‘personal privacy and infor-
mation’ and ensuring that users ‘respect the dignity of others and not 
harass or degrade others.’”32 Voice can also be enhanced by notions of 
newsworthiness and public interest.33 Thus, even in cases where voice 
may be restricted by the other values, it can still win out if it is augmented 
by newsworthiness and public interest. Facebook handles this through a 
balancing test that involves “weighing the public interest value against 
the risk of harm, and [looking] to international human rights standards to 
make these judgments.”34  
The central issue, however, is that “risk of harm,” “newsworthiness,” 
“public interest,” and “international human rights standards” remain un-
defined in Facebook’s Community Standards, public statements, postings, 
as well as Kettemann and Schulz’s observations.35 While Facebook does 
publish minutes of its Product Policy Forum meetings, meeting partici-
pants do not apply structured frameworks or  articulate the actual quasi-
legal reasoning used to reach their conclusions.36 Furthermore, the bal-
ancing test is hard to square with how Facebook conducts policy change 
processes. When conducting such processes, Facebook asks “[d]o folks 
have concerns?” Here, the “folks” refer to “civil society organizations, 
activist groups, and thought leaders, in such areas as digital and civil 
rights, anti-discrimination, free speech, and human rights.”37 From the 
civil society and human rights perspectives, this is good. However, when 
concerns were raised, they “were usually not tied directly to either na-
tional laws or international norms nor to Facebook’s values such as 
voice.”38 
                                                        
31 Id. 
32 KETTEMANN & SCHULZ, supra note 1, at 18. 
33 KETTEMANN & SCHULZ, supra note 1, at 18. 
34 KETTEMANN & SCHULZ, supra note 1, at 20 (quoting Monika Bickert). 
35 KETTEMANN & SCHULZ, supra note 1, at 19 (“Privacy and dignity are constitutional values 
that are explicitly protected in all liberal democracies and by the International Bill of Rights and 
regional human rights conventions. The Community Standards do not explicitly refer to these 
documents…[t]he same is true for the described method of ‘weighing the public interest value 
against the risk of harm’.”). 
36 Product Policy Forum Minutes, FACEBOOK (Nov. 15, 2018), 
https://about.fb.com/news/2018/11/content-standards-forum-minutes.  
37 Stakeholder Engagement: How Does Stakeholder Engagement Help Us Develop Our Com-
munity Standards?, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/stakeholder_engagement (last visited July 21, 
2020).  
38 KETTEMANN & SCHULZ, supra note 1, at 26. 
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Facebook also tends to escalate “normative change processes” to 
senior leadership (typically Mark Zuckerberg, Sheryl Sandberg, Joel 
Kaplan and Nick Clegg)39 but how it does this is completely opaque. Ac-
cording to Kettemann and Schultz, “[t]he role of integrating leadership 
feedback here seems to rest, as has been described in a number of jour-
nalistic pieces, with Monika Bickert, the VP for Global Policy Manage-
ment, who would, if needed, ‘take it [i.e. the issue] to Mark [Zucker-
berg].’ We could not shed more light on this. Our methods of observation 
unfortunately had their limits.”40 
Facebook states that the balancing test helps to reconcile conflicts 
among values, but in reality, the test is applied secretly and without refer-
ence to any structured, public, and transparent framework. Looking to 
IHRL as guidance is the way for Facebook to address these problems. 
Facebook’s current processes, values, and Community Standards are 
drafted and modified solely by Facebook. By contrast, IHRL was devel-
oped independent of Facebook or any other social media company’s in-
fluence. The ICCPR has 173 state parties41 and the Genocide Convention 
has 147 parties. Many of their provisions can be said to reflect customary 
international law. The ICCPR maps freedom of expression and appropri-
ate restrictions thereof, which appears to overlap with Facebook’s con-
tent moderation efforts. Importantly, the Oversight Board can cite and 
rely on IHRL as a source of law, rather than a quasi-legal construct of the 
Community Standards and Facebook’s internal debates. 
Facebook itself has said that “[w]e look for guidance in documents 
like Article 19 of the ICCPR, which set standards for when it’s appropri-
ate to place restrictions on freedom of expression.”42 The ICCPR main-
tains that everyone has the right to freedom of expression and that re-
strictions on this right are only allowed when they are “provided by law 
                                                        
39 See Elizabeth Dwoskin & Nitasha Tiku, Facebook Employees Said They Were ‘Caught in an 
Abusive Relationship’ with Trump as Internal Debates Raged, WASH. POST (June 5, 2020), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/technology/2020/06/05/facebook-zuckerberg-trump/ 
[https://perma.cc/H94L-AS9V] (“In addition to diversity head Williams, the team that made the 
decision included Zuckerberg; Sandberg; Joel Kaplan, the vice president for U.S. public policy; 
and Nick Clegg, the vice president of global affairs and communications; as well as the head of 
human resources and the general counsel.”); Sheera Frankel, Delay, Deny and Deflect: How 
Facebook’s Leaders Fought Through Crisis, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2018), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/11/14/technology/facebook-data-russia-election-racism.html 
[https://perma.cc/9Y85-VRUN] (“Some at Facebook viewed Mr. Trump’s 2015 attack on Mus-
lims as an opportunity to finally take a stand against the hate speech coursing through its plat-
form. But Ms. Sandberg, who was edging back to work after the death of her husband several 
months earlier, delegated the matter to Mr. Schrage and Monika Bickert, a former prosecutor 
whom Ms. Sandberg had recruited as the company’s head of global policy management. Ms. 
Sandberg also turned to the Washington office — particularly to Mr. Kaplan, said people who 
participated in or were briefed on the discussions.”). 
40 KETTEMANN & SCHULZ, supra note 1, at 29. 
41 Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Status of Ratification: Inter-
active Dashboard, https://indicators.ohchr.org (last visited July 21, 2020). 
42 Richard Allan, Hard Questions: Where Do We Draw the Line on Free Expression?, 
FACEBOOK (Aug. 9, 2018), https://about.fb.com/news/2018/08/hard-questions-free-expression. 
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and are necessary for: (a) the respect of the rights or reputations of oth-
ers; (b) for the protection of national security or of the public order, or of 
public health or morals.”43 However, Facebook has adopted a conclusory 
interpretation of Article 19, noting, “[t]he core concept here is whether a 
particular restriction of speech is necessary to prevent harm. Short of 
that, the ICCPR holds that speech should be allowed. This is the same 
test we use to draw the line on Facebook.”44 By collapsing the ICCPR 
Article 19(3) tests of legality, legitimacy, and necessity and proportionali-
ty into an undefined “risk of harm” test, Facebook has failed to adopt a 
real test at all, and has instead maintained the current regime of ad-hoc 
content decision making.  In that same post, Facebook goes on to apply a 
harm-based analysis independent of what the ICCPR says.45 Consistent 
with Kettemann and Schulz’s findings, Facebook continues to wield un-
defined discretion. Harm is how Facebook itself defines it. 
B. Applying IHRL to Content Decisions Gives Social Media 
Companies Legitimacy and Provides One Universal Standard 
As we can see, Facebook’s current interpretation of IHRL is vague. 
IHRL is referenced as a source of ‘guidance,’ while moderation in prac-
tice continues to be ad hoc and non-transparent. This section argues that 
IHRL, if correctly applied, can provide legitimacy to Facebook’s content 
moderation decisions. There is a strong argument to be made that Face-
book and its Oversight Board have willingly bound themselves to IHRL. 
Facebook has stated46 that it will comply with the UN Guiding Principles 
on Business and Human Rights (the “UNGPs”).47 Facebook’s agreement 
to comply with the UNGPs essentially prevents Facebook from claiming 
that IHRL applies only to states. Guiding Principle (GP) 11 states that 
“[b]usiness enterprises should respect human rights.”48 GP 12 interprets 
“respect human rights” to mean “at a minimum, as  those  expressed  in  
the  International  Bill  of  Human  Rights  and  the  principles  concern-
ing  fundamental  rights  set  out  in  the  International  Labour  Organiza-
tion’s  Declaration  on  Fundamental  Principles  and  Rights at Work.”49 
The commentary to GP 12 states that the International Bill of Human 
Rights consists of “the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
main instruments through which it has been  codified: The International 
                                                        
43 ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 19. 
44 Allan, supra note 42, at para. 5. 
45 Allan, supra note 42, at para. 9. 
46 Alex Warofka, Human Rights Impact of Facebook in Myanmar, FACEBOOK (Nov. 5, 2018), 
https://about.fb.com/news/2018/11/myanmar-hria. 
47 Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Guiding Principles on 
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” 
Framework, UN Doc HR/PUB/11/04 (2011), https://www.ohchr.org/documents/publications/ 
guidingprinciplesbusinesshr_en.pdf.  
48 Id. at 13. 
49 Id. 
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Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.”50 GP 31 deals with the “effective-
ness criteria for non-judicial grievance mechanisms,” which is exactly 
what the Oversight Board and Facebook’s appeals processes for content 
moderation are.51 GP 31 outlines eight criteria “to ensure their effective-
ness”: 
 
a) Legitimate: enabling trust from the stakeholder groups for 
whose use they are intended, and being accountable for the 
fair conduct of grievance processes;  
b) Accessible: being known to all stakeholder groups for whose 
use they are intended, and providing adequate assistance for 
those who may face particular barriers to access;  
c) Predictable: providing a clear and known procedure with an 
indicative time frame for each stage, and clarity on the types 
of process and outcome available and means of monitoring 
implementation;  
d) Equitable: seeking to ensure that aggrieved parties have 
reasonable access to sources of information, advice and 
expertise necessary to engage in a grievance process on fair, 
informed and respectful terms;  
e) Transparent: keeping parties to a grievance informed about 
its progress, and providing sufficient information about the 
mechanism’s performance to build confidence in its 
effectiveness and meet any public interest at stake;  
f) Rights-compatible: ensuring that outcomes and remedies 
accord with internationally recognized human rights;  
g) A source of continuous learning: drawing on relevant 
measures to identify lessons for improving the mechanism 
and preventing future grievances and harms;  
 
Operational-Level Mechanisms should also be: 
 
h) Based on engagement and dialogue: consulting the 
stakeholder groups for whose use they are intended on their 
design and performance and focusing on dialogue as the 
means to address and resolve grievances.52 
 
In applying GP 31 to Facebook’s own content moderation tests, one 
sees how inadequate Facebook’s tests are. The manner in which Face-
book currently makes content decisions does not enable trust; these con-
                                                        
50 Id. at 14. 
51 Id. at 33. 
52 Id. at 35. 
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tent moderation processes are famously opaque.53  Content decisions are 
not accessible or predictable.54 In 2017, journalists forced Facebook to 
admit to making mistakes in decisions on over half of the cases of hate 
speech that the journalists identified.55 One might say that the Communi-
ty Standards have increased equity, but the grievance process is still 
opaque. It took a year after the leak of its internal guidance for content 
moderators before Facebook published information on how content 
moderation decisions are made in practice. At the same time, Facebook 
launched, for the first time, an appeals process for wrongfully removed of 
content.56 Ad hoc decision-making not only obscures how outcomes and 
remedies accord with IHRL but also impedes continuous learning. Only 
recently has Facebook increased engagement and dialogue with stake-
holder groups, including the Oversight Board itself.57 
The issues flagged by GP 31 can be addressed by respecting and im-
plementing the IHRL in a transparent, predictable, and structured man-
ner. With a clearly structured framework for the Oversight Board to ap-
ply, its members would be inclined to use the ICCPR for decision 
making. This in turn would give Facebook, the Board, and a future Social 
Media Council both independence and legitimacy for content decisions. 
Facebook could start with the key multilateral treaty on freedom of ex-
pression, the ICCPR.58 The key challenge here concerns how to apply the 
ICCPR, which was written for states, to powerful non-state actors.   
This essay does not argue that Facebook and the Oversight Board 
should adopt all IHRL sources. Instead, it recommends that both Face-
book and the Oversight Board tread carefully by first starting with im-
plementation of ICCPR Article 19. Some IHRL sources, such as Article 
20 of the ICCPR, need significant clarification by scholars, practitioners, 
and other observers before they can be applied to Facebook content 
moderation rules.59 The Board and commentators will have to do work to 
make clear what Article 20 terms like “incitement” and “advocacy to ha-
tred” mean as applied to Facebook. Where other sources of IHRL con-
                                                        
53 Sarah Roberts, Digital Detritus: ‘Error’ and the Logic of Opacity in Social Media Content 
Moderation, 23:3 FIRST MONDAY (2018), https://firstmonday.org/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/ 
8283/6649. 
54 Kate Klonick, The New Governors: The People, Rules, and Processes Governing Online 
Speech, 131 HARV. L. REV. 1598 (2018). 
55 Madeleine Varner, Ariana Tobin, Julia Angwin & Jeff Larson, What Does Facebook Consider 
Hate Speech?, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 28, 2017) https://projects.propublica.org/graphics/facebook-
hate [https://perma.cc/93UP-D58X]. 
56 Julia Carrie Wong & Olivia Solon, Facebook Releases Content Moderation Guidelines–Rules 
Long Kept Secret, THE GUARDIAN, (Apr. 24, 2018), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
technology/2018/apr/24/facebook-releases-content-moderation-guidelines-secret-rules 
[https://perma.cc/2GJV-7CUE]. 
57 Warofka, supra note 46, paras. 6, 34. 
58 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, T.I.A.S. 92-908, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171. 
59 Id., art. 20. 
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flict with the ICCPR Article 19, the Article 19 of the ICCPR should con-
trol. 
C. The ICCPR Is the Scaffolding, But IHRL Still Needs to be 
Concretely Adapted to Social Media Companies 
 Facebook has agreed to “respect human rights” under the UNGPs 
and has stated that it will look to the ICCPR for guidance. The next step 
is to determine how the ICCPR can help rather than hinder social media 
companies in making content decisions. The proposed framework is as 
follows. Facebook will no longer be in the business of “making up rules.” 
Instead, whenever Facebook decides to draft or amend its Community 
Standards and make content reviews and decisions, its leadership and the 
Oversight Board should adopt the following procedure.  
 
1. Adapt ICCPR Article 20 to social media companies in a way 
that is comprehensible. Being part of IHRL, Article 20 can-
not be ignored. At present, however, Article 20(2) and the 
Rabat definitions60 interpreting Article 20(2) are almost in-
coherent. Significant interpretive guidance on Article 20 
must be provided by IHRL institutions, commentators, and 
the Oversight Board itself. 
2. Apply the adapted ICCPR Article 19(3) test–to be examined 
in Part III–to see whether prohibition of the content in ques-
tion may be permissible. Some guiding questions include: 
a. Did Facebook draft and issue the content prohibi-
tion in accordance with our adapted legality test? 
b. Does Facebook have a legitimate interest(s) in the 
content prohibition? 
c. In light of the adapted Rabat 6-factor test, is Face-
book’s content prohibition necessary and propor-
tionate to the legitimate interest Facebook has as-
serted? 
III. Whose Legality, Legitimacy, Necessity and Proportionality? 
In this section, I describe existing problems with Article 20 of the 
ICCPR, which complicates its adaptability to social media companies. By 
comparison, Article 19 of the ICCPR is much easier to adapt. I articulate 
how the three prongs of Article 19–(i) legality, (ii) legitimacy, and (iii) 
necessity and proportionality–can be workably adapted to content mod-
eration by Facebook and other social media companies.  
                                                        
60 As will be discussed later in this piece, the Rabat Plan of Action makes attempts to define the 
terms in Article 20 terms. However, I believe that Rabat fails in this regard. See infra note 66. 
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A. Article 20: Not the Best Written Article of the ICCPR 
Under the ICCPR, Article 19 is not the only article that governs 
freedom of expression. Per David Kaye, the UN Special Rapporteur for 
Freedom of Expression, “[u]nder article 20(2) of the Covenant, States 
parties are obligated to prohibit by law ‘any advocacy of national, racial 
or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility 
or violence.’ States are not obligated to criminalize such kinds of expres-
sion.”61 ICCPR Article 20 also requires that “[a]ny propaganda for war 
shall be prohibited by law.”62 Adapted to social media companies, Article 
20 sets the standard by which social media companies are required to re-
strict certain kinds of content. Of course, since social media companies do 
not have law making powers, their adapted Article 20(2) obligations be-
come that of prohibiting such content via their Terms of Service (e.g. Fa-
cebook’s Community Standards).63 
ICCPR Article 20 suffers from vagueness. Neither “propaganda for 
war” nor “constitutes incitement” is defined. In response to this issue, 
ARTICLE 19 drafted the Camden Principles, which proposes definitions 
for some of the terms in Article 20, namely “hatred,” “hostility,” “advo-
cacy,” and “incitement.”64 Similarly, the UN Office of the High Commis-
sioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) has also completed a four-year initi-
ative to clarify Article 20.65 The Rabat Plan of Action (“Rabat”) is the 
outcome of that initiative. While Rabat provides sample definitions of 
Article 20 terms for states to implement–which were adapted from the 
Camden Principles–it unfortunately muddies them by combining “incite-
ment” and “hatred” while at the same time retaining separate definitions 
for each.66 How muddied are the Rabat definitions of Article 20 terms? 
Let’s see: 
 
                                                        
61 Kaye, supra note 22, at para. 8. 
62 ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 20(1). 
63 Kaye, supra note 22, at para. 10 (“[a] critical point is that the individual whose expression is to 
be prohibited under article 20 (2) of the Covenant is the advocate whose advocacy constitutes 
incitement. A person who is not advocating hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, 
hostility or violence, for example, a person advocating a minority or even offensive interpreta-
tion of a religious tenet or historical event, or a person sharing examples of hatred and incite-
ment to report on or raise awareness of the issue, is not to be silenced under article 20 (or any 
other provision of human rights law).”). 
64 ARTICLE 19, The Camden Principles on Freedom of Expression and Equality (Apr. 2009) 
https://www.article19.org/data/files/pdfs/standards/the-camden-principles-on-freedom-of-
expression-and-equality.pdf.  
65 ARTICLE 19, ARTICLE 19 welcomes the Rabat Plan of Action on Prohibition of Incitement 
and Calls for its Full Implementation (Nov. 16, 2012), https://www.article19.org/resources/article-
19-welcomes-rabat-plan-action-prohibition-incitement-calls-full-implementation. 
66 See U. N., Rabat Plan of Action on the Prohibition of Advocacy of National, Racial or Reli-
gious Hatred that Constitutes Incitement to Discrimination, Hostility or Violence, 
A/HRC/22/17/Add.4 (Oct. 5, 2012) https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ 
Opinion/SeminarRabat/Rabat_draft_outcome.pdf [hereinafter Rabat]; see also Rabat, 10 n. 5, 
(all other definitions); Rabat, 9 n. 21 (Rabat prefers that states “consider including robust defini-
tions of key terms such as hatred, discrimination, violence, hostility, among others”).   
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• Rabat utilizes “incitement to hatred” as a catch-all term for 
“any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that 
constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or vio-
lence.”67 Yet incitement also “refers to statements about na-
tional, racial or religious groups which create an imminent 
risk of discrimination, hostility or violence against persons 
belonging to those groups.”68 
• “Hatred” and “hostility” somehow have the same definition. 
They “refer to intense and irrational emotions of opprobri-
um, enmity and detestation towards the target group.”69 This 
is confusing because “incitement to hatred” includes not on-
ly hostility but also “discrimination” and “violence.”  
• Advocacy “is to be understood as requiring an intention to 
promote hatred publicly towards the target group.”70 But 
“hatred” is used in advocacy’s singular definition as well as 
the catch-all definition of “incitement to hatred,” which in-
cludes incitement to discrimination, hostility, or violence. In 
the overall definition, “hatred” is also used, but separate 
from “advocacy,” in the language “any advocacy of national, 
racial, or religious hatred.”71  
 
To say that this is confusing is an understatement. Rabat’s Article 20 
definitions are riddled with tautologies.  
Under the most charitable reading, the Rabat Plan seems to prohibit 
intense and irrational public speech that intends to incite discrimination, 
hostility, or violence based on nationality, race, or religion. Thus, states 
would be required to prohibit content fitting this reading. “Violence” 
perhaps has a straightforward definition of physical harm against people. 
Rabat itself and human rights INGOs have left states to interpret the 
IHRL definitions of “discrimination” and “hostility” when implementing 
domestic laws for the ICCPR. Facebook and the Oversight Board will 
likely have similar definitional duties. Facebook and the Oversight Board 
will also have to define “propaganda for war” in Article 20(1)–perhaps by 
drawing on IHRL sources such as the Geneva Conventions.  
In summary, when Facebook and the Oversight Board are deciding 
what speech they are required to prohibit, they must look to ICCPR Ar-
ticle 20(1) and 20(2)–perhaps employing the tests I have proposed above. 
Due to the confusion surrounding Article 20 and Rabat, however, this 
                                                        
67 Id. at 6 n. 1 (defining “incitement to hatred”). 
68 Id. at 10 n. 5 (defining “incitement”). 
69 Id. at 10 n. 5. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 6 n. 1. 
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will not be the focus of this Essay. Instead, I shall focus on a clearer test, 
which is found in Article 19 of the ICCPR.72  
B. Article 19: When Content May Be Restricted 
Much of the credit for establishing how IHRL may be applied to so-
cial media companies goes to the text of the ICCPR itself and UNHRC’s 
General Comment No. 34. David Kaye has taken both the ICCPR text 
and General Comment No. 34 and provided further analysis. In his Octo-
ber 2019 submission, Kaye writes that the ICCPR has long been the key 
IHRL source of law, noting that ICCPR Article 19(1) “protects the right 
to hold opinions without interference” and Article 19(2) “guarantees the 
right to freedom of expression, that is, the right to seek, receive and im-
part information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, through 
any media.”73 In that submission, Kaye also discusses Article 19(3), which 
limits expression under Article 19(2) “only where provided by law and 
necessary to respect the rights or reputations of others or protect national 
security, public order, public health or morals.”74 Noting that these are 
“narrowly defined exceptions . . . the burden falls on the authority re-
stricting speech to justify the restriction, not on the speakers to demon-
strate that they have the right to such speech.”75 
When Facebook is deciding how to craft its Community Standards 
and algorithms on content it decides to restrict (rather than required by 
IHRL to prohibit), it should rely on the three-prong test articulated in 
ICCPR Article 19(3). When the Oversight Board is reviewing Facebook’s 
decision on a piece of content, the Oversight Board should assess wheth-
er Facebook has acted, both in its actions and the Community Standards, 
in accordance with ICCPR Article 19(3). Besides the ICCPR, General 
Comment No. 34 also offers an authoritative interpretation of the (i) le-
gality, (ii) legitimacy, and (ii) necessity and proportionality prongs of Ar-
ticle 19(3).76 
Legality: “The restriction must be provided by laws that are precise, 
public and transparent; it must avoid providing authorities with un-
                                                        
72 Note that Rabat has stated that the “higher threshold” in Article 20 must “take into account 
the provisions of article 19… the three-part test (legality, proportionality and necessity) for re-
strictions also applies to cases involving incitement to hatred, in that such restrictions must be 
provided by law, be narrowly defined to serve a legitimate interest, and be necessary in a demo-
cratic society to protect that interest”. Id. at 9 para. 18. As a practical matter and as will be dis-
cussed later in this essay, the necessity and proportionality prong of Article 19 should limit Arti-
cle 20 to require prohibition of speech only for the most intense and irrational public speech that 
intends to incite discrimination, hostility, or violence based on nationality, race, or religion, in 
accordance with the Rabat 6-factor test–lesser speech should be subject to sanction less than 
prohibition. 
73 Kaye, supra note 22, at para. 5. 
74 Kaye, supra note 22, at para. 6. 
75 Kaye, supra note 22, at para. 6. 
76 UNHRC General Comment No. 34, para. 6, CCPR/C/GC/34 (Sept. 12, 2011), 
https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/docs/GC34.pdf. 
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bounded discretion, and appropriate notice must be given to those whose 
speech is being regulated. Rules should be subject to public comment and 
regular legislative or administrative processes. Procedural safeguards, es-
pecially those guaranteed by independent courts or tribunals, should pro-
tect rights.”77 
Legitimacy: “The restriction should be justified to protect one or 
more of the interests specified in article 19 (3) of the Covenant, that is, to 
respect the rights or reputations of others or to protect national security, 
public order, public health or morals.”78 
Necessity and Proportionality: “The restriction must be demon-
strated by the State as necessary to protect a legitimate interest and to be 
the least restrictive means to achieve the purported aim. The Human 
Rights Committee has referred to these conditions as ‘strict tests’, accord-
ing to which restrictions ‘must be applied only for those purposes for 
which they were prescribed and must be directly related to the specific 
need on which they are predicated.’”79 
IV. Adapting the ICCPR to Social Media Companies (Non-States) 
Despite being a good starting point, David Kaye’s analysis fails to 
take note of the fact that since the ICCPR is a multilateral treaty adopted 
by states (countries), there is language in Article 19(3) that does not 
make sense in the context of social media companies. I argue that the 
language of Article 19(3) needs to be adapted to fit the needs of social 
media companies. This section breaks down how social media companies 
can apply each of the three tests from Article 19(3)–(i) legality, (ii) legit-
imacy, and (iii) necessity and proportionality–to their content moderation 
decisions. 
A. Adapting Legality to Social Media Companies 
Unlike countries, social media companies cannot pass laws because 
they are not states imbued with a legislative function by the consent of 
the governed. Nor can social media companies guarantee the protection 
of rights using procedural safeguards by independent courts or tribunals, 
since they are not states imbued with a judicial function. How can a “le-
gality” prong be applied to social media companies, who have no powers 
of law? I suggest that IHRL provides the answer. 173 member states have 
consented to the ICCPR. The ICCPR’s “legality” prong imposes re-
                                                        
77 Kaye, supra note 22, at para. 6(a). 
78 Kaye, supra note 22, at para. 6(b) 
79 Kaye, supra note 22, at para. 6(c). Put differently, there can be valid restrictions on freedom of 
expression (i) if the restriction is a valid law subject to public review and judicial review, (ii) if 
the restriction is justified by one of the enumerated legitimate interests, (iii) if the restriction is 
the least restrictive means to protect a justifiable legitimate interest, and (iv) if the restriction is 
directly related to that interest. 
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quirements on states to guarantee the protection of rights through proce-
dural safeguards, including independent review. Recall that Facebook has 
already consented to the UNGPs as well ICCPR Article 19. Imposing an 
IHRL framework on social media companies’ content moderation rules 
and independent review of those rules through the Oversight Board is the 
answer. The question then becomes how to adapt the “legality” prong to 
social media companies. 
As applied to Facebook, its Community Standards are currently not 
in compliance with this adapted legality prong. While Facebook’s stand-
ards are “public,” they are neither “precise” nor “transparent.” As INGO 
ARTICLE 19 notes, many terms are not defined, and the Community 
Standards are changed often without any notice or rationale given.80 Fa-
cebook currently has “unbounded discretion”81 in coming up with and 
implementing the Community Standards. Proposed edits to the Commu-
nity Standards are neither “subject to public comment” nor “regu-
lar...administrative processes.”82 The pending Oversight Board could pro-
vide the relevant “procedural safeguards, especially those guaranteed by 
independent courts or tribunals” to “protect rights,” but this remains to 
be seen.83 
The legality prong is applicable to the algorithms Facebook uses to 
determine a post’s virality, as well as takedowns of posts that presump-
tively contain “hate speech” or incitement of violence. I have suggested 
to the Oversight Board staff that independent audits of Facebook’s algo-
rithms and human content moderators should fall under the Oversight 
Board’s jurisdiction. The “procedural safeguards” of the legality prong 
may require “human-in-the-loop” machine learning, whereby humans are 
involved in training and testing algorithms.84 
B. Adapting Legitimacy to Social Media Companies 
The legitimate interests of states are not equivalent to the legitimate 
interests of social media companies. As applied to social media compa-
nies, legitimate interests generally fall within a spectrum. On the one end 
are national security interests, which I believe social media companies 
cannot invoke. They cannot claim national security as a legitimate inter-
                                                        
80 ARTICLE 19, Facebook Community Standards: Analysis Against International Standards on 
Freedom of Expression (Jul. 30, 2018) https://www.article19.org/resources/facebook-community-
standards-analysis-against-international-standards-on-freedom-of-expression. Note that Face-
book has made effort to define some terms since this report, showing the importance of inde-
pendent and public analysis. 
81 Kaye, supra note 22, at para. 6(a). 
82 Kaye, supra note 22, at para. 6(a). 
83 Kaye, supra note 22, at para. 6(a). 
84 See Kaye, supra note 22, at para. 58(d) (“Ensure that any enforcement of hate speech rules 
involves an evaluation of context and the harm that the content imposes on users and the public, 
including by ensuring that any use of automation or artificial intelligence tools involve human-in-
the-loop”). 
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est to restrict speech or say, give speech (e.g. user data) to governments. 
On the other end are public health interests, which social medial compa-
nies can invoke and which are the easiest to defend. All other interests 
fall somewhere in between. 
1. National Security 
National security, with one important exception, is not a “legitimate 
interest” for social media companies given that they have no “national” 
security interests to protect. General Comment No. 34 notes that states 
must take care to ensure that laws limiting expression related to “official 
secrets,” “sedition laws or otherwise,” and “prosecut[ing] journalists, re-
searchers, environmental activities, human rights defenders, or others” be 
extremely narrowly tailored in accordance with Article 19(3).85 At any 
rate, none of those examples are within social media companies’ pow-
ers.86 If social media companies were to deploy similar restrictions (e.g. 
sedition communications against states), the Oversight Board or Social 
Media Council should find these restrictions illegitimate.87  
The important exception is that social media companies may use the 
“national security” interest as a rationale against following state-asserted 
national security claims (e.g. the Chinese government stating that they 
need TikTok’s user data for national security purposes). TikTok, in this 
instance, may validly claim that since it is a social media company, and 
not a nation, it cannot assert a national security rationale as a reason to 
restrict or provide speech. 
2. Rights and Reputations of Others 
General Comment No. 34, paragraph 28, advances the “rights and 
reputations of others” as a legitimate interest through citation to HRC 
decisions: 
The term ‘rights’ includes human rights as recognized in the Covenant and 
more generally in international human rights law. For example, it may be 
legitimate to restrict freedom of expression in order to protect the right to 
vote under article 25, as well as rights under article 17 . . . Such restrictions 
must be constructed with care: while it may be permissible to protect vot-
                                                        
85 General Comment No. 34, supra note 76, at para. 30. 
86 See Kaye, supra note 22, at para. 30. 
87 Some have questioned whether social media companies should be applying national security 
interest rules to protecting the security of states (e.g. preventing terrorists from using Facebook 
to coordinate bombings). The use of these interests to restrict content, however, may open the 
door for sovereigns to accuse social media companies of defining what constitutes a valid “na-
tional security” interest, which has traditionally been the role of states and applicable tribunals, 
not social media companies. States may then argue that social media companies should instead 
act in compliance with “national security” domestic laws, regardless of whether or not these laws 
are compliant with IHRL. In light of this danger, it is better for social media companies to rely 
instead on the legitimate interest of “public order”–discussed below–in order to protect their 
own users from violence. 
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ers from forms of expression that constitute intimidation or coercion, such 
restrictions must not impede political debate, including, for example, calls 
for the boycotting of a non-compulsory vote.”88  
 
Facebook appears to manifest this voting interest through a News-
room post linked to its Manipulated Media,89 Violence and Incitement,90 
and Coordinating Harm and Publicizing Crime Community Standards. 
Facebook also has Community Standards governing intellectual 
property rights91 and privacy rights.92 Article 15.1(c) of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) recognizes 
the rights of everyone “[t]o benefit from the protection of the moral and 
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic 
production of which he is the author.”93 UNGP 12, which Facebook has 
consented to following, lists ICESCR in its commentary as one of the 
sources of IHRL that business enterprises must follow to respect human 
rights.94 Therefore, the protection of intellectual property rights is a valid 
application of the “rights and reputations of others” as a legitimate inter-
est under the proposed ICCPR Article 19 test.95  
It is also likely that the rights and reputations of others interest ap-
plies to the “public figure” concept in law. General Comment No. 34 
notes that the ICCPR places high value on protecting uninhibited expres-
sion in public debate concerning public figures in the political domain and 
public institutions: “All public figures, including those exercising the 
highest political authority such as heads of state and government, are le-
gitimately subject to criticism and political opposition.”96 As will be 
shown in the adapted Rabat test I propose later in this essay, some re-
strictions on freedom of expression towards public figures may be im-
permissible given their public speaker status, but other restrictions may 
                                                        
88 General Comment No. 34, supra note 76, at para. 28 (emphasis added). 
89 See Kevin Martin & Samidh Chakrabarti, Helping to Protect the 2020 US Census, FACEBOOK 
(Dec. 19, 2019), https://about.fb.com/news/2019/12/helping-protect-the-us-census. 
90 Violence and Incitement: Policy Rationale, FACEBOOK (June 2020), 
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/recentupdates/all_updates (“Any content con-
taining statements of intent, calls for action, or advocating for high or mid-severity violence due 
to voting, voter registration, or the outcome of an election. Misrepresentation of the dates, loca-
tions, and times, and methods for voting or voter registration. . . . Misrepresentation of who can 
vote, qualifications for voting, whether a vote will be counted, and what information and/or ma-
terials must be provided in order to vote. . . . Other misrepresentations related to voting in an 
official election may be subject to false news standards, as referenced in section 18.”). 
91 Community Standards, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/ 
intellectual_property (last visited July 21, 2020). 
92 Privacy Violation and Image Privacy Rights, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/ 
communitystandards/privacy_violations_image_rights (last visited July 21, 2020). 
93 U.N. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, art. 15, Dec. 16, 1966, 
993 U.N.T.S. 3. 
94 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 47. 
95 ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 19. 
96 General Comment No. 34, supra note 76, at para. 38. 
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be permissible if the public speaker is using their position to spread con-
tent that runs afoul of one of the legitimate interests in Article 19. 
3. Public Order 
General Comment No. 34, paragraph 31, notes that “it may, for in-
stance, be permissible in certain circumstances to regulate speech-making 
in a particular public place,” mentioning “[c]ontempt of court proceed-
ings” as an example97. Thus, social media companies may cite “public 
order” interests to prevent incitement of violence, disturbance of peace, 
or other criminal activities that might arise on their platforms.98  
Social media companies may also have a commercial interest in 
maintaining public order on their platforms so as to not disrupt the user 
experience. Such disruptions may alienate users or cause them to leave. 
For example, imagine a scenario where an app like Tinder, which has an 
interest in maintaining a good dating user experience for its users, gets 
overrun by users making trolling or offensive comments on their Tinder 
profiles. Tinder’s users start leaving the platform for other dating apps 
due to the hostile user experience. Tinder may reasonably prohibit such 
content in order to maintain its central dating user experience. Thus nar-
rowly tailored restrictions on user safety,99 hate speech,100 pornography, 
and cyberbullying are appropriate under the public order interest, and 
Facebook has Community Standards for these categories.101 As 
                                                        
97 General Comment No. 34, supra note 76, at para. 31. 
98 See, e.g., Violence and Criminal Behavior, FACEBOOK, 
https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/violence_criminal_behavior (last visited July 21, 
2020). However, the legitimacy prong in tandem with the legality prong reveals several issues 
with how Facebook has drafted this section. For example, for “dangerous individuals and organ-
izations”, Facebook provides no precision or process or independent review of how it decides 
that an organization is “proclaim[ing] a violent mission or [is] engaged in violence to have a 
presence on Facebook.”  
99 Safety, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/safety (last visited July 
21, 2020). 
100 Given the use of hate speech to incite violence in Myanmar and other countries, the legiti-
mate interest of public order should apply. In terms of sources of IHRL, the UN Strategy and 
Plan of Action on Hate Speech is controlling. UN, Strategy and Plan of Action on Hate Speech, 
2 (May 2019), https://www.un.org/en/genocideprevention/documents/ 
UN%20Strategy%20and%20Plan%20of%20Action%20on%20Hate%20Speech%2018%20Jun
e%20SYNOPSIS.pdf. (providing a definition for “hate speech” as “any kind of communication 
in speech, writing or behaviour, that attacks or uses pejorative or discriminatory language with 
reference to a person or a group on the basis of who they are, in other words, based on their reli-
gion, ethnicity, nationality, race, colour, descent, gender or other identity factor.”) The docu-
ment also notes that content containing this alone is insufficient, but requires also “incitement to 
discrimination, hostility and violence”, an apparent reference to ICCPR Article 20(2), (which 
again leaves the outstanding issue of needing to clear up exactly what Article 20(2) means, while 
also noting that any Article 20 analysis must be in conformance with Article 19’s requirements). 
Id. at 1. 
101 See Adult Nudity and Sexual Activity, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/ 
communitystandards/recentupdates/adult_nudity_sexual_activity (last visited July 21, 2020); Bul-
lying and Harassment, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/ 
recentupdates/bullying (last visited July 21, 2020). 
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Kettemann and Schulz note, the fact that “we did not notice any refer-
ence to economic interests, much less controlling economic interests in 
the process, does of course not mean that they are irrelevant.”102 It is 
important to emphasize that since Facebook covers a much broader set of 
human expression as part of its user experience–as compared to Tinder–
this suggests that more kinds of expression on Facebook are permissible 
and in line with user experience. This means that restrictions of expres-
sions on Facebook must be narrowly tailored. 
The scope of the Oversight Board’s powers is in dispute as of the 
writing of this piece. Some commentators worry that the Oversight Board 
will only have “thumbs up, thumbs down” powers over one-off content 
moderation decisions rather than the power to review the machine learn-
ing, technical, and operational elements involved in content moderation 
which would have large scale impact.103 Such efforts not only require 
power of oversight over algorithms and automated content moderation, 
but also human-coordinated propaganda that are often much more effec-
tive in spreading disinformation, misinformation, and malinformation.104 
Public order interests should be interpreted to grant the Board broad 
powers to make these important decisions. 
Currently, the Oversight Board’s charter and bylaws are vague on 
the scope of the Board’s powers. Their powers are also limited by proce-
dure. The Board currently has no sua sponte powers105 and must wait for 
a case to be brought before the Board for review, either through an ap-
peals process or by the urging of Facebook itself.106 I suggest that the 
Board be granted sua sponte powers, either by its own Marbury107 fiat in 
a case decision, or in updated bylaws that the Oversight Board intends to 
release later this year. Such sua sponte powers should grant the Board au-
thority to initiate its own cases based on its observations of trends on the 
Facebook platform and beyond. 
                                                        
102 KETTEMANN & SCHULZ, supra note 1, at 31. 
103 Matthew Ingram, Alex Stamos Talks About Facebook’s Oversight Board, GALLERY BY CJR 
https://galley.cjr.org/public/conversations/-M74eLMfvkdKpIPjRfo4 (last visited Jul. 21, 2020). 
104 UNESCO, Journalism, ‘Fake News’ and Disinformation: A Handbook for Journalism Educa-
tion and Training (2018), https://en.unesco.org/fightfakenews. 
105 See Legal Information Institute (LII), Sua sponte, CORNELL L. SCH., 
https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/sua_sponte (“Latin for ‘of one's own accord; voluntarily.’ Used 
to indicate that a court has taken notice of an issue on its own motion without prompting or sug-
gestion from either party.”). 
106 See Oversight Board Charter, art. 2, § 1, FACEBOOK (“In instances where people disagree 
with the outcome of Facebook’s decision and have exhausted appeals, a request for review can 
be submitted to the board by either the original poster of the content or a person who previously 
submitted the content to Facebook for review. Separately, Facebook can submit requests for 
review, including additional questions related to the treatment of content beyond whether the 
content should be allowed or removed completely.”). 
107 See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803) (“It is emphatically the province and duty of 
the Judicial Department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular cases 
must, of necessity, expound and interpret that rule.”). 
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4. Public Health 
In contrast to “national security”, public health may be the interest 
most readily applicable to social media companies who have an interest in 
battling misinformation on their platforms that may affect the health of 
their users. Facebook’s current efforts to combat coronavirus misinfor-
mation are representative of this interest in action.108 For example, online 
illegal wildlife trade is growing in recent years, especially on Facebook.109 
It may be that the next COVID-19 pandemic emerges from the illegal 
trading of wildlife online. Facebook currently relies on NGOs such as the 
World Wildlife Fund (WWF) to give them notice of such trades. Howev-
er, having a structured IHRL public health framework would be superior 
to Facebook’s current ad hoc approach to public health issues. The Over-
sight Board could find that the WHO Constitution110 and the Internation-
al Health Regulations (IHR)111 must be adapted to Facebook’s content 
moderation regulations and procedures. This would be in line with Face-
book’s commitment to following the UNGPs. Article 6 of the IHR may 
require Facebook to give timely notice to the WHO “of all events which 
may constitute a public health emergency of international concern.”112 
This would create an obligation on Facebook to proactively monitor and 
report future public health emergencies like COVID-19.  
Such a requirement would not be too onerous as Facebook already 
does this for child pornography. Child pornography and illegal wildlife 
trade are amendable to computer vision solutions, such as PhotoDNA, 
which Microsoft developed and has donated to the National Center for 
Missing & Exploited Children (NCMEC). Currently, Facebook uses to 
this technology to detect child pornography.113  
                                                        
108 Kang-Xang Jin, Head of Health, Keeping People Safe and Informed About the Coronavirus, 
FACEBOOK (June 24, 2020), https://about.fb.com/news/2020/06/coronavirus 
[https://perma.cc/6ZM3-RJBH]; Virginia Allen, What Does Facebook’s New Oversight Board 
Mean for Conservative Posts?, THE DAILY SIGNAL (May 14, 2020), 
https://www.dailysignal.com/2020/05/14/what-does-facebooks-new-oversight-board-mean-for-
conservative-posts [https://perma.cc/9MV6-DU7S]. 
109 See, e.g., Thu Thu Aung, Facebook Purges Ads for Illegal Wildlife in Southeast Asia as 
Online Trade Surges, REUTERS (Aug. 6, 2020), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-myanmar-
wildlife/facebook-purges-ads-for-illegal-wildlife-in-southeast-asia-as-online-trade-surges-
idUSKCN2520C3 [https://perma.cc/83P7-7UMA 
] (“in the five months through May 2020, a report seen by Reuters showed World Wildlife Fund 
researchers had counted 2,143 wild animals from 94 species for sale on Facebook from Myanmar 
alone.”).  
110 Constitution of the World Health Organization, WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO) 
(July 22, 1948), https://apps.who.int/gb/bd/PDF/bd47/EN/constitution-en.pdf?ua=1. The WHO 
has 194 member states as of this writing. 
111 International Health Regulations (IHR), WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION (WHO) (2d ed., 
2005), https://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/handle/10665/43883/9789241580410_eng.pdf;jsessionid 
=D5EF0D27BE1F21742EF7BDECF713C286?sequence=1.  
112 Id. art. 6, para. 1. 
113 Riva Richmond, Facebook’s New Way to Combat Child Pornography, N.Y. TIMES (May 19, 
2011), https://gadgetwise.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/05/19/facebook-to-combat-child-porn-using-
microsofts-technology/?partner=rss&emc=rss [https://perma.cc/SE5U-GQWV].  
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Using the proposed sua sponte powers described earlier, the Over-
sight Board could issue an opinion requiring Facebook to apply computer 
vision solutions like PhotoDNA to the online illegal wildlife trade, and 
stating that Facebook must have proactive safeguards in place for public 
health issues.  
5. Morals 
Morals are perhaps the most ambiguous, and thus troubling, of “le-
gitimate interests.” General Comment No. 34 notes that in the previous 
General Comment No. 22, “the concept of morals derives from many so-
cial, philosophical and religious traditions; consequently, limitations . . . 
for the purpose of protecting morals must be based on principles not de-
riving exclusively from a single tradition.”114 The HRC goes on to say that 
“[a]ny such limitations must be understood in the light of universality of 
human rights and the principle of non-discrimination.” The HRC’s guid-
ance on morals is so vague as to be meaningless and even dangerous, al-
lowing all kinds of interests to be smuggled through and be considered 
“legitimate.” UNGP 12 provides some clarity, noting that, 
 
[d]epending on circumstances, business enterprises may need to consider 
additional standards . . . enterprises should respect the human rights of 
individuals belonging to specific groups or populations that require partic-
ular attention, where they may have adverse human rights impacts on 
them. In this connection, United Nations instruments have elaborated 
further on the rights of indigenous peoples; women; national or ethnic, re-
ligious and linguistic minorities; children; persons with disabilities; and mi-
grant workers and their families.115  
 
In practice, this would mean that the legitimate interest of morals 
may be applied with reference to restrictions or obligations on freedom of 
expression in treaties that are widely adopted (i.e. having many member 
states). With regards children, for example, the relevant “additional 
standard” is the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC),116 a treaty 
ratified by 196 countries. General Comment No. 13 interprets the CRC, 
with paragraph 21(g) interpreting Article 19 of the CRC (“measures to 
protect the child from all forms of physical or mental violence”), by stat-
ing that child “cyberbullying” is a form of “mental violence” that states 
need to protect against.117 Similarly, paragraph 25 of General Comment 
                                                        
114 General Comment No. 34, supra note 76, at para. 32. 
115 Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, supra note 47 (emphasis added). 
116 U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, Sept. 2, 1990, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. 
https://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/docs/CRC.C.GC.13_en.pdf. 
117 UNHRC General Comment No. 13, para. 21(g), CRC/C/GC/13 (Apr. 18, 2011), 
https://www.refworld.org/docid/4e6da4922.html. 
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No. 13 details “sexual abuse and exploitation” as something that states 
should protect against.118  
Defining “morals” through General Comment No. 22 and GP 12 
prevents “morals” from becoming a cover for whatever interests the 
Oversight Board members might prefer. This is accomplished by limiting 
the definition of “morals” to whatever has been ratified in multilateral 
treaties by the global community. It must be noted that definitions of 
“morals” are still subject to the requirement that Article 19(3) be inter-
preted consistent with enjoyment of all the other rights in the ICCPR. 
This means that regressive interpretations of “morals,” even those found 
in other multilateral treaties, would be considered inconsistent and inap-
plicable. 
There have been calls by some commentators to allow national or 
regional collections of advisors to consult with the Oversight Board on 
what specific national or regional morals may be applicable to any given 
case. This is problematic. Relying on the ideologies of a handful of advi-
sors to articulate what “morals” mean gives too much influence to the se-
lection criteria. A better means of articulating morals is to rely on multi-
lateral treaties that have been adopted by a wide array of member states. 
Any reference to moral interests in the community standards or similar 
sources of quasi law needs to cite to the applicable multilateral treaty 
(e.g. CRC) and the relevant principle in the treaty (e.g. protection from 
child abuse). 
C. Adapting Necessity and Proportionality to Social Media 
Companies 
Provided that there is at least one legitimate interest presented by 
the social media company, the analysis then shifts to a balancing test to 
assess whether the restriction is necessary and proportionate to protect-
ing that interest. Facebook says it uses a test to balance the voice value of 
a post against its newsworthiness, public interest, and four additional val-
ues: authenticity, safety, privacy, and dignity. In practice, however, as 
Kettemann and Schulz have documented, Facebook’s policy teams do not 
apply this test in a structured or transparent way.119 The balancing test I 
propose, via the necessity and proportionality prong of ICCPR Article 
19(3), would bring transparency and structure to Facebook’s balancing 
                                                        
118 Id. at para. 25. Note that other sources of IHRL are not only limited to the legitimate interest 
of morals. In the UN General Assembly Resolution 68/167, for example, “[t]he right to privacy 
in the digital age,” can apply, though that may apply under the rights and reputations of others 
legitimate interest. See G.A. Res. 68/167 (Dec. 18, 2013). The question of which interest applies 
likely hinges on the distinction between “rights” and “morals.” In my view, “rights” are clearly 
stated as “rights” in sources of IHRL, whereas morals are not. However, there may be enough 
ambiguity here to comprise an open question for the Oversight Board to decide. 
119 KETTEMANN & SCHULZ, supra note 1, at 19. 
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test and close the gap between what Facebook has promised to do and 
what it currently does. 
The balancing test is by nature a fact-based analysis. The HRC in 
General Comment No. 34, paragraphs 33-34, relies on HRC decisions; it 
makes sense that the HRC finds its own decisions persuasive. The Over-
sight Board’s proponents have stated that a proportionality test will be 
used in the Oversight Board’s decision making. The issue here is whether 
the Oversight Board should give persuasive weight to other tribunals or 
quasi-judicial bodies such as the HRC or European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR) when making its decisions. As I will detail further be-
low, I believe the answer to this is no.  
In applying necessity and proportionality to social media companies, 
the distinction between private sector social media companies and states 
becomes profound. Entities like the Facebook Oversight Board have dis-
cretion to issue decisions that may have different outcomes than a tribu-
nal adjudicating nation-state issues. The term “least restrictive means” 
has a different meaning for a social media company than a state, as the 
latter has the power (i) to issue monetary fines, (ii) to order an actor to 
do or not do some activity (e.g. injunctive relief), and/or (iii) to deprive 
someone of their physical freedom (e.g. imprisonment). Social media 
companies currently have none of these powers–though this is likely to 
change in the future with the proliferation of e-payments on Facebook’s 
platform.120 Currently, a company like Facebook only has the power (i) to 
turn off virality for the content, (ii) to take down the content, (iii) to tem-
porarily ban a user for a period of time, or (iv) to permanently ban a user. 
As noted by David Kaye, “in each case, it would remain essential for the 
[social media company] to demonstrate the necessity and proportionality 
of taking action, and the harsher the penalty, the greater the need for 
demonstrating strict necessity.”121  
D. Necessity and Proportionality: Social Media Companies Are 
Different 
In order to make sure that restrictions on expression are necessary 
and proportionate, I argue that social media companies should apply an 
adapted Rabat test. Although Rabat was written to clarify which expres-
sions states should be required to prohibit, an adapted Rabat can instead 
                                                        
120 See Kevin Webb, Facebook’s New Payment Service Will Let You Send Money Without Fees 
Across Facebook, Instagram, WhatsApp, and Messenger, BUSINESS INSIDER (Nov. 12, 2019), 
https://markets.businessinsider.com/news/stocks/facebook-pay-payments-instagram-whatsapp 
messenger-send-money-2019-11-1028682585?fbclid=iwar176yjvkwqohp5wmfn43hspedacyx 
sqlke9vrkj30xryqd2yorhu38w6lu# [https://perma.cc/7KQ7-TS5Q]. For example, Facebook may 
be able to temporarily or permanently ban accounts from sending or receiving payments, using 
ad boosts, or even issuing fines for certain infractions. Facebook may also decide to freeze the 
payment accounts for users who are promoting illegal wildlife trade on Facebook, which could 
contribute to the spread of zoonotic diseases like Covid-19. 
121 Kaye, supra note 22, at para. 20 (emphasis added). 
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test the proportionality of the restrictions that social media companies 
adopt. As discussed earlier, Rabat is an attempt to clarify ICCPR Article 
20(2), which requires states to prohibit by law “any advocacy of national, 
racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, 
hostility or violence.”122 
 It is important to note that prohibitions can take civil, administra-
tive, or criminal forms.123 Rabat employs a 6-factor test “to determine the 
severity necessary to criminalize incitement,” and includes the following 
factors.124  
 
• The “social and political context prevalent at the time the 
speech was made and disseminated.” 
• The status of the speaker, “specifically the individual’s or 
organization’s standing in the context of the audience to 
whom the speech is directed.” 
• Intent, meaning that “negligence and recklessness are not 
sufficient for an offence under article 20 of the Covenant”, 
which provides that mere distribution or circulation does not 
amount to advocacy or incitement. 
• Content and form of the speech, in particular “the degree 
to which the speech was provocative and direct, as well as 
the form, style, nature of arguments deployed.” 
• Extent or reach of the speech act, such as the “magnitude 
and size of its audience”, including whether it was “a single 
leaflet or broadcast in the mainstream media or via the In-
ternet, the frequency, the quantity and the extent of the 
communications, whether the audience had the means to act 
on the incitement.” 
• Its likelihood, including imminence, meaning that “some 
degree of risk of harm must be identified”, including through 
the determination (by courts, as suggested in the Plan of Ac-
tion) of a “reasonable probability that the speech would suc-
ceed in inciting actual action against the target group.”125 
 
While these six tests were designed in order to determine which ex-
pression states should be required to prohibit, they can also be relevant to 
determining the appropriate type of restriction that companies can use 
when they choose to limit expression on their platforms. David Kaye has 
already made this connection: 
 
                                                        
122 ICCPR, supra note 19, art. 20(2). 
123 Rabat, supra note 66, at para. 20. 
124 Kaye, supra note 22, at para. 14 (citing Rabat, supra note 66, at para. 29). 
125 Rabat, supra note 66 at para. 29(f). 
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A set of factors is identified in the Rabat Plan of Action that is appli-
cable to the criminalization of incitement under article 20 (2) of the 
Covenant, but those factors should have weight in the context of com-
pany actions against speech as well. They need not be applied in the 
same way as they would be applied in a criminal context. However, they 
offer a valuable framework for examining when the specifically defined 
content–the posts or the words or images that comprise the post–merits a 
restriction.126  
 
To apply Kaye’s suggestion to social media companies, the Rabat 
test should be part of a floor of content that social media companies 
should be required to prohibit through their own quasi-law (e.g. the Fa-
cebook Community Standards), just as Article 20 and Rabat are intended 
for states. For content regulation that falls outside of Article 20’s domain, 
Article 19(3) should be used, with perhaps a pathway for Rabat and Arti-
cle 19(3) to assess where on the sliding scale of available punishments the 
Oversight Board should land. This pathway will be discussed below. 
Given that social media companies are different in character from 
states, regional and domestic tribunal decisions and laws should not have 
persuasive or precedential weight on decisions made by the Facebook 
Oversight Board as it relates the criteria of necessity and proportionality. 
Were this not the case, countries would be able to argue that their domes-
tic laws on freedom of expression should be controlling on the Oversight 
Board. Observers such as the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ) 
have noted that domestic legislation on freedom of expression tends to be 
overbroad and too favourable toward government interpretations of 
freedom of expression.127 The ICJ has specifically documented how 
“Southeast Asian governments have, for decades, crafted and enforced 
the law to curtail expression and information” with many of these legal 
frameworks sharing the following characteristics: “vague, overbroad legal 
provisions; severe and disproportionate penalties; lack of independent 
oversight mechanisms; and failure to provide effective remedy or ac-
countability.”128  
The ICJ notes that “[c]onceptions of ‘national security’ and ‘public 
order’ have been conflated with the perceived interests of the ruling gov-
ernment or other powerful interest groups to target specific expression. 
Emerging laws claim extraterritorial application, and in some cases, seek 
to extend their reach beyond public expression, to private communica-
tions. These frameworks either do not advance legitimate aims or do not 
do so in accordance with applicable principles of legitimacy or necessity 
                                                        
126 Kaye, supra note 22, at para. 49 (emphasis added). 
127 Kaye, supra note 22, at para. 4.  
128 INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, Southeast Asia: ICJ Launches Report on Increas-
ing Restrictions on Online Speech (Dec. 11, 2019), https://www.icj.org/southeast-asia-icj-
launches-report-on-increasing-restrictions-on-online-speech [https://perma.cc/WKS8-F9EQ]. 
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and proportionality, and are thus ‘in violation of international law.’”129 
For example, Singapore recently passed a “fake news” law that INGO 
ARTICLE 19 notes gives the “government the power to decide what is 
true and false in Singapore.”130 Adherence to regional and domestic tri-
bunals and laws, which are projections of state power, are not sound 
guides for the Facebook Oversight Board. The HRC is right to conclude, 
in General Comment No. 34, that the scope of freedom of expression “is 
not to be assessed by reference to a ‘margin of appreciation’” as the Eu-
ropean Court of Human Rights uses.131 Instead “a State party, in any giv-
en case, must demonstrate in specific fashion the precise nature of the 
threat to any of the enumerated grounds listed in paragraph [Article 
19](3) that has caused it to restrict freedom of expression.”132 
The discussion above suggests that it is best to allow the Oversight 
Board to determine the “least restrictive means” that are “directly relat-
ed” to the specific legitimate interest at hand. The Oversight Board is 
likely to issue decisions through trial and error on virality switch offs, 
takedowns, temporary and permanent bans, and other means that social 
media companies have in contrast to the sanctioning powers nation states 
have. This sliding scale will be referenced against a growing “case law” of 
borderline fact patterns that will adumbrate what necessity and propor-
tionality mean as applied to social media companies.133   
Take, as a hypothetical, an initial decision involving a Facebook post 
by a head of state inciting violence against Muslims. The Oversight Board 
runs the facts of this case through the Rabat 6-factor test and finds the 
following: 
 
1) Social and political context: for this country there is a re-
cent history of actual violence against Muslims. On a severity 
scale from 1 (least severe) to 5 (most severe), the Board 
gives a score of 4. 
2) Status of the speaker: the speaker is a head of state, so the 
Board gives a score of 5. 
3) Intent: the head of state claims that he was joking when he 
made the comment, so the Board gives a score of 2. 
                                                        
129 Id. 
130 ARTICLE 19, Singapore: New Law on ‘Online Falsehoods’ a Grave Threat to Freedom of 
Expression (May 9, 2019), https://www.article19.org/resources/singapore-new-law-on-online-
falsehoods-a-grave-threat-to-freedom-of-expression. 
131 General Comment No. 34, supra note 76, at para. 36. 
132 General Comment No. 34, supra note 76, at para. 36. 
133 See Oversight Board Bylaws § 1.2.1, FACEBOOK (Jan. 2020), https://about.fb.com/wp-
content/uploads/2020/01/Bylaws_v6.pdf (“The case selection committee will set criteria (e.g. im-
portance and precedential impact) for the cases that the board will prioritize and select for re-
view, which may change over time”); Oversight Board Charter, art. 2, § 2, FACEBOOK (“For 
each decision, any prior board decisions will have precedential value and should be viewed as 
highly persuasive when the facts, applicable policies, or other factors are substantially similar.”). 
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4) Content and form of the speech: the speaker said “all Mus-
lims want to do is take over our country. Every good Chris-
tian should get a gun and kill them all.” The Board gives a 
score of 5. 
5) Magnitude and size of its audience: the speaker has a large 
following on Facebook, with over 20 million fans. The post 
has 50,000 likes, 10,000 shares, and 2 million views. The 
Board gives a score of 4. 
6) Likelihood (including imminence): the speaker did not 
speak precisely as to the time, date, and venue, but did men-
tion the use of guns, in a country with previous killings of 
Muslims. Christians have said that they were inspired by the 
president. The Board gives a score of 4.  
 
With an overall score of 24 out of 30,134 the Board finds the speech 
severe enough to ban the post despite the head of state’s comments being 
“newsworthy.” A subsequent Board decision may involve a private indi-
vidual Facebook post stating that the individual “hates Muslims,” which 
is shared with the individual’s friends. Were the Board, in applying the 
same Rabat 6-factor test, to permanently ban this user, the Board would 
likely be in violation of its precedent given that the overall scores for this 
woman’s speech are likely to be lower than 24 out of 30. 
This numerical scoring system ensures that the severity of the speech 
is taken into account in determining the appropriate sanction, thus satis-
fying the necessity and proportionality test of Article 19(3). All factors 
need not be present in any given fact pattern, as the intensity/severity of 
each individual factor can vary greatly. For example, perhaps “intent and 
imminence” factors are not found, in which case a milder punishment 
may be recommended–though a punishment can still be imposed. This is 
unlike the Rabat test as it was developed for Article 20(2), which would 
only necessitate a punishment if all six factors were satisfied.  
Entities like the Oversight Board may consider this adapted Rabat 
test or come up with a similar (or different) test. Such tests can also be 
used to assess whether the algorithms Facebook deploys to limit or ban 
content are using the “least restrictive means” when rendering sanctions.  
If, for example, the Oversight Board finds that the algorithms are trained 
on a mislabelled data set to remove false positives by applying the Rabat 
test (e.g. the algorithm overweights the calculation of speaker status and 
intent), it could issue a decision requiring Facebook to more narrowly tai-
lor its algorithm and training data labels to reduce such takedowns. 
 
                                                        
134 Note that I am not suggesting the Board use a numerical scoring system in practice–the num-
bers are used to clarify the example for the reader. 
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E. Applying this Framework to Facebook Oversight Board 
Decisions 
Imagine an edge case is brought before the Facebook Oversight 
Board. This case concerns whether Facebook’s takedown of a corona-
virus post, which features a video clip of a country’s president claiming 
that the novel coronavirus is a Chinese government bioweapon run amok, 
is an appropriate content moderation decision.  
First, an Article 20 analysis is conducted. Under my formulation of 
Article 20, which states that intense and irrational public speech that in-
tends to incite discrimination, hostility, or violence based on nationality, 
race, or religion should be blocked, there does not appear to be clear evi-
dence of intent in this case. This means that Facebook is not required to 
ban the content. 
Facebook, however, may ban the content, and so the proposed 
framework shifts to an Article 19(3) analysis which examines (i) legality, 
(ii) legitimacy, and (iii) necessity and proportionality. Under the legality 
prong, Facebook argues that its decision to take down the content is in 
line with its Community Standards on “False News.”135 Facebook’s News-
room post on coronavirus states that when “[o]ur global network of third-
party fact-checkers . . . rate information [related to the coronavirus] as 
false, we limit its spread on Facebook and Instagram and show people ac-
curate information from these partners. We also send notifications to 
people who already shared or are trying to share this content to alert 
them that it’s been fact-checked. We will also start to remove content 
with false claims or conspiracy theories that have been flagged by leading 
global health organizations and local health authorities that could cause 
harm to people who believe them.”136 The Oversight Board finds that Fa-
cebook’s False News Community Standards are not “precise” as required 
by the legality prong of Article 19(3), since they are silent on public 
health matters. They find the Newsroom post to not be precise or trans-
parent in terms of how its “global network of third-party fact-checkers” 
decide such content is false. Moreover, they take issue with Facebook’s 
failure to determine who its “leading global health organizations and lo-
cal health authorities” are.137 However, they do find the standards to be 
“precise, public and transparent” in terms of limiting virality.138  
The Oversight Board directs Facebook to articulate its fact-checking 
process and identify, by name, its “leading global health organizations 
and local health authorities.” The Board requires Facebook to disclose 
the computer science labels that its content reviewers use to label posts 
                                                        
135 False News, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/communitystandards/false_news (last 
visited July 21, 2020). 
136 Jin, supra note 108. 
137 Jin, supra note 108. 
138 Kaye, supra note 22, at para. 6(a). 
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for training data purposes, and how it designs its algorithms to automate 
this human cognitive work. The Oversight Board notes that Facebook 
had no “public comment” process for banning coronavirus false news, 
though it acknowledges that there are “expedient circumstances”139 in 
light of the pandemic that may warrant Facebook taking action before 
opening up a public comment period. The Oversight Board notes that 
Facebook has “unbounded discretion” to decide this; however, it requires 
that it get approval from the World Health Organization (WHO) in the 
future before issuing new rules related to public health, unless the WHO 
unduly delays its approval and Facebook is compelled to act quickly due 
to expedient circumstances, with such approval eventually to be obtained 
in due course. The Oversight Board notes that the Board’s own existence, 
plus the required input from the WHO, would be good “procedural safe-
guards.” 
Under the legitimacy prong, Facebook claims it has both “public 
health” and “public order” interests in preventing harm. Facebook also 
claims that the “public health” interest requires them to give notice to the 
WHO of COVID-19 misinformation and disinformation on the platform. 
The Oversight Board agrees with Facebook’s public health claims; how-
ever, since the President only said China could “not be trusted” rather 
than inciting some disruption or violent action against China, the “public 
order” interest is not found. 
Finally, under the necessity and proportionality prong, the Oversight 
Board finds Facebook’s decision to turn off virality for false news posts 
and instead show correct information to be the “least restrictive means” 
to protect public health interests. After Facebook provides the algorith-
mic labels to the Oversight Board,140 the Oversight Board, with assistance 
from its technical staff,141 concludes that the algorithmic weights for pun-
ishment recommendations are not aligned with the degree of severity for 
each of the Rabat test’s six factors. The Oversight Board finds that Face-
book’s decision to ban posts that only signal distrust (instead of, say, in-
citing physical harm) to be not the “least restrictive means” available. 
The Oversight Board therefore instructs Facebook to abandon the 
takedowns, and instead to only turn off virality for these posts and to 
                                                        
139 This would be an example of the Oversight Board having the flexibility of making new “com-
mon law” for the peculiar nature of ever-evolving social media companies. The proposed IHRL 
framework in this essay is very permissive of the Oversight Board to come up with new rules; the 
essay merely proposes a reasoning framework rooted in IHRL to serve as a foundation and in-
dependent check for Oversight Board decisions that has widespread legitimacy among the global 
community due to overwhelming adoption of multilateral treaties like the ICCPR and CRC by 
most countries of the world. 
140 Facebook here may require that the labels and algorithms provided to the Oversight Board 
being kept under seal, for risk of exposing its processes to coordinated propagandists who could 
learn how to evade detection. This essay does not have an opinion as to whether such seals 
should be given and leaves this question open for other commentators to decide. 
141 Facebook has told the author that the support staff for the Oversight Board will include peo-
ple with technical backgrounds in computer science. 
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point to corrections written by Poynter-approved fact-checkers.142 Face-
book must also tweak its algorithms and labels to ensure that this change 
is implemented in its automated detection of coronavirus misinformation 
moving forward. The Oversight Board’s technical staff, using encrypted 
enclaves as part of the Confidential Computing Consortium,143 audits Fa-
cebook’s algorithms144 to ensure that they have been tweaked properly in 
accordance with this decision. 
The example above is obviously hypothetical. The Oversight Board 
may not rule in this fashion. That being said, my intent is to show how the 
Oversight Board can employ a structured decision-making procedure that 
not only accords with IHRL, but also gives the Oversight Board the flexi-
bility it needs to come up with new “common law” that addresses the 
novel context of social media companies. 
V. Conclusion 
The Facebook Oversight Board has the potential to become an im-
mense, world-changing success. It could constitute a new quasi-judicial 
body that draws on a respected source of law, the IHRL, to which most 
states have already consented, and advance freedoms of expression and 
the protection of certain classes of people such as racial and ethnic minor-
ities, women, and children. Crucially, the Oversight Board and other So-
cial Media Councils would benefit from adopting IHRL because it would 
give these entities a basis for pushing back against illegitimate orders or 
requests from nation states using the IHRL framework.  
The Oversight Board would give international law teeth and serve as 
an antidote to the growing geopolitics enveloping tech, especially be-
tween China and the United States. If successful, the Oversight Board 
could turn into a more general Social Media Council, with all social me-
dia companies coming under its ambit, regardless of national origin. At 
the same time, the Oversight Board could also become what its detractors 
fear: a kangaroo court. 
Forthright adoption and adaptation of international human rights 
law is the key to giving the Oversight Board a sense of legitimacy in its 
fledgling days, especially as it struggles to prove that it is more than just a 
cover for Facebook to continue business as usual. I hope that this paper 
can act as a guidepost for how IHRL can be usefully applied in the Over-
sight Board’s decisions. By providing a functional framework that grants 
the Oversight Board discretion to narrowly tailor decisions, Article 19 of 
                                                        
142 POYNTER: THE INTERNATIONAL FACTCHECKING NETWORK (IFCN), 
https://www.poynter.org/ifcn(last visited Jul. 21, 2020). The Poynter IFCN is considered by the 
UN and other agencies to be the leading fact-checking institute in the world.  
143 CONFIDENTIAL COMPUTING CONSORTIUM, MEMBERS, 
https://confidentialcomputing.io/members (last visited Jul. 21, 2020). 
144 OPEN ENCLAVE SDK, https://openenclave.io/sdk (last visited Jul. 21, 2020). 
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the ICCPR can allow the Oversight Board to come up with its own 
“common law.” This framework is not the final word, but rather the start 
of a robust debate and discussion about how the Oversight Board can 
make content decisions and policy recommendations while respecting 
human rights. 
